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Abstract
This paper presents new empirical evidence on the effectiveness of Bank
of Japan’s foreign exchange interventions on the daily realized volatility of
USD/JPY exchange rates using high frequency data. Following Huang and
Tauchen (2005) and Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004, 2006), we use
bi–power variation to decompose daily realized volatility into two compo-
nents: the smooth persistent and the discontinuous jump components. We
model exchange rate returns, the different components of realized volatility
and the central bank intervention using a system of simultaneous equations.
We find strong support that interventions by Bank of Japan had increased
both the continuous and the jump components of daily realized volatility.
This suggests that the interventions by Bank of Japan had increased mar-
ket volatility which not only caused short-lived positive jumps but were also
persistent over time. We did not find any evidence that interventions were
effective in influencing the exchange rate returns for the entire sample period.
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1. Introduction
The effect of foreign exchange intervention on exchange rates has been a
constant topic of discussion in the academic and policy circle ever since the
collapse of the Bretton-Woods system in the early 1970s. Despite the move
to floating exchange rates, central banks of several countries have intervened
heavily in the foreign exchange market to manipulate their nominal exchange
rates and ‘calm’ disorderly markets1. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) on behalf of
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) carried out extensive interventions in the FX
market in efforts to reduce the value of the yen. During the period of April
1991 and August 2006, the total amount of interventions conducted by BOJ
was about 68 trillion yen (approximately 600 billion U.S. dollars)2. These
actions on the part of the Japanese monetary authorities are understandable
given the role of the export sector in their economic recovery. Had the BOJ
been effective in its intervention operations? Had the BOJ been successful
in depreciating the yen and reducing the volatility of the yen? Given the
significance of understanding how central bank interventions (CBIs hereafter)
affect the FX markets, it is important to critically examine the answers to
these questions.
Several authors have analyzed the effects of CBI on the FX market by
looking at the impact on both the level and the volatility of exchange rate. In
general, the literature is inconclusive about the impact of CBI on exchange
rate returns. For example, Humpage (1988) and Baille and Humpage (1992)
have found that intervention was ineffective in influencing the level of ex-
change rate. Baillie and Osterberg (1997) finds that the effect of CBI on
spot exchange rate returns are counterproductive, i.e. purchase of US dollars
leads to a depreciation of the US dollar3. This result holds for both unilateral
and coordinated interventions. Others like Dominguez and Frankel (1993),
1These actions by the central banks have been implicitly defined in two major interna-
tional agreements: the goal of the Plaza Accord in September 22, 1985 was to seek central
bank cooperation to sharply depreciate the US dollar and the Louvre Accord in February
22, 1987 emphasized the need to stabilize the exchange rate volatility.
2Dominguez (2006) reports that during New York trading hours on May 31, 1995, BOJ
and Fed coordinated their interventions: BOJ purchased $767.4 million against yen on one
occasion and the U.S. government purchased a total of $500 million against yen on three
occasions. This had resulted in a 2% increase in the value of dollar against yen over the
course of the day.
3Similar result was obtained by Beine et al. (2002).
2
Fatum and Hutchison (2003), Dominguez (2003), Humpage (2003), and Ito
(2003) conclude that CBI had a significant impact on the exchange rate, at
least in the very short run, when it was publicly announced, coordinated,
large, and infrequent.
The studies looking at the effect of interventions on the volatility of ex-
change rates are more conclusive. Most studies, employing different mea-
sures of volatility, conclude that the CBI tends to increase the exchange
rate volatility. Using measures of implied volatility, Bosner–Neal and Tanner
(1996) and Dominguez (1998) find that CBI increases exchange rate volatil-
ity. Other studies like Dominguez (1998) and Beine et al. (2002) using
GARCH-type models, and Beine et al. (2009) and Dominguez (2006) using
realized volatility models, arrive at the same conclusion. This finding is con-
trary to the aim of the central bank which intervenes to counter disorderly
FX markets4. However, there are some studies that either do not find any
impact of CBI on exchange rate volatility (Galati et al., 2005) or find that
CBI is associated with less exchange rate volatility at least for parts of the
sample period (Hillebrand and Schnabl, 2009)5.
In this paper, we seek to further advance our understanding of the impact
CBI on the two different components of exchange rate volatility - the ‘contin-
uous’ persistent part and the discontinuous ‘jump’ component. To the best of
our knowledge, no previous study, with the exception of Beine et al. (2007),
has analyzed the relation between CBI and the volatility components. Beine
et al. (2007) had captured the long memory in the volatility process with an
ARFIMA specification in the spirit of Andersen et al. (1999). The authors,
however, have not addressed the the problem of endogeneity of intervention
and exchange rates which is a key issue in these studies6. We have modelled
the different components of exchange rate volatility and intervention in a
simultaneous equation framework, explicitly accounting for the endogeneity
in the coefficient on contemporaneous interventions.
The empirical literature examining the effect of CBI on exchange rate
4Article 40 of The Bank of Japan Law states that “The Bank shall buy and sell foreign
exchange as an agent of the government, in accordance with the provisions of Article 36,
Paragraph 1, when its purpose is to stabilize the exchange rate of the national currency.”
5Hillebrand and Schnabl (2009) find that intervention by BOJ has decreased the yen-
dollar exchange rate volatility since 2000.
6Kearns and Rigobon (2005) show that failing to account for the endogeneity will likely
bias the coefficient on contemporaneous intervention downwards.
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volatilities have mostly modeled volatility in the framework of GARCH-type
models. However, recent developments in econometric methodology and the
increasing availability of high-frequency data have shifted the paradigm from
the discrete-time GARCH class of models to the non-parametric approach for
modeling and forecasting time-varying daily market volatility. The empirical
results in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (2003) strongly indicate
that models of realized volatility outperform the popular GARCH-type and
related stochastic volatility models in out-of-sample forecasting. Other stud-
ies such as Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold,
and Labys (2001a, b), and Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004, 2006) have
shown the importance of explicitly allowing for jumps, or discontinuities, in
the estimation of continuous time stochastic volatility models7. In partic-
ular, it has been found that many (log) price processes are best described
by a combination of a smooth and very slowly mean-reverting continuous
sample path process and a discontinuous jump component. Thus it is impor-
tant to distinguishing jump from non-jump movements. One advantage of
separating out the smooth persistent volatility component and the much less
persistent jump process is that it can describe price (exchange rate) processes
in-sample better and also provide out-of-sample forecasts accurately8.
Due to extreme market events or macro announcements, there might be
presence of unusually large movements in the price processes relative to what
continuous-time diffusive models in finance would suggest. Our approach to
modelling exchange rate volatility builds directly on the theoretical results
in Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004, 2006) and Huang and Tauchen
(2005). We decompose the daily realized volatility into a jump and a per-
sistent process using bi–power variation as indicated by the authors. It has
been shown that realized volatility is a consistent estimator for both, the
integrated variance and the jumps, in the return process. We calculate the
realized bi–power variation based on adjacent absolute intra-daily returns.
The jump component of the realized volatility is consistently estimated by
the difference between the realized volatility and bi–power variation.
We examine the effect of BOJ’s foreign exchange interventions on the
7Andersen et al. (2001a, b) provide an extensive examination of the statistical proper-
ties, modelling and forecasting of realized volatility of foreign exchange rates.
8Andersen et al. (2007) demonstrate important gains in accuracy at daily, weekly,
and even monthly forecast horizons by explicitly differentiating the jump and continuous
sample path components.
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volatility of USD/JPY and DEM/JPY (EUR/JPY) exchange rates using in-
traday quotes from April 1, 1991 to July 31, 2006. We present new evidence
on the efficacy of central bank interventions on the different components of
exchange rate volatility. Our study adds to the literature in the following two
ways. First, we model and estimate the effect of CBI on the ‘continuous’ per-
sistent and the discontinuous ‘jump’ components of daily realized volatility.
Our measure of realized volatility is an ‘observed model-free’ variable rather
than a ‘latent’ one as is often used in the stochastic volatility or GARCH-
type models. Realized volatility, computed as the sum of the squared intra-
day returns, captures all the price (foreign exchange rate) movements within
each day. Second, we tackle the problem of endogeneity by estimating the
contemporaneous interactions between central bank interventions, exchange
rate returns, and the continuous and jump volatility components within a
simultaneous equation framework.
We report the following findings. First, our testing reveals that inter-
ventions by BOJ were unsuccessful in stabilizing the daily realized market
volatility. We show that both the continuous and discontinuous components
of volatility increased due to CBI. These results are robust in the USD/JPY
and DEM/JPY (EUR/JPY) markets. This suggests that the interventions
by BOJ had increased market volatility which were not only short-lived but
also persistent over time. We also look at coordinated interventions by BOJ
with the Fed in the USD/JPY market. The results of such concerted ef-
forts were still the same, i.e. it had a positive correlation with both the
volatility components. We provide sub-sample analysis based on structural
breaks identified from the literature. Our estimation results indicate that
BOJ interventions were significant and positively correlated with the per-
sistent volatility component in all the sub-periods. However, the effect on
the jump component was insignificant for the first two sub-samples. This
would suggest that the true transient component of the volatility were more
significant after 1998 when the BOJ interventions were infrequent and large.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section gives details for
realized volatility decomposition. Section 3 describes the estimation strategy
and data. Section 4 discusses our main findings. Concluding remarks are
offered in Section 5.
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2. Exchange Rate Dynamics and Realized Volatility Decomposi-
tion
Let pt = log (Pt) denote the logarithmic price of the asset or foreign
exchange rate at day t and let rt,i be the intraday log return at time t(i)
between t− 1 and t:
rt,i = 100× [pt(i) − pt(i−1)]. (1)
We decompose daily realized volatility into a continuous (persistent) and
jump components by a method proposed by Huang and Tauchen (2005) and
Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004, 2006). First, for each day t, we com-
pute the daily realized variance (RVt) as the sum of squared intraday returns:
RVt =
M∑
i=1
r2t,i, (2)
where M is the total number of intraday returns within day t. Since we
use high-frequency data, the intraday return series can be contaminated by
market microstructure noise, hence, it can bias our approximation of the
daily variance. Andersen et al. (2000), we choose five-minute returns to
compute the realized variance of exchange rate. The authors suggests that
five minute is the “optimal” interval for the computation of RVt to avoid
contamination due to microstructure noises.
One natural measure for the smooth persistent part of RVt is the realized
bi-power variation as proposed by Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004):
BVt =
pi
2
M
M − 1
M∑
i=2
|rt,i−1||rt,i|, (3)
The authors have shown that as M → ∞, BVt converges to the daily inte-
grated variance unaffected by jumps. As a result, the difference RVt − BVt
becomes a consistent measure for the jump component in the total daily re-
alized variance. Based on the theoretical results in Barndorff-Nielsen and
Shephard (2004), Huang and Tauchen (2005) proposes a jump statistic for
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detecting jumps on each day t:
zt =
RVt−BVt
RVt√
(pi
2
4
+ pi − 5) 1
M
TPt
BV 2t
, (4)
TPt = Mµ
−3
4/3
M
M − 2
M∑
i=3
|rt,i−2|4/3|rt,i−1|4/3|rt,i|4/3, (5)
(6)
where µk = 2
k/2Γ[(k + 1)/2]/Γ(1/2) is a normalizing term and Γ(p) =∫∞
0
tp−1e−tdt for any positive p. Since
zt
M→∞−−−−→ N(0, 1), (7)
denoting the continuous and jump volatility components as Ct and Jt respec-
tively, we compute both Ct and Jt as follows:
Ct = 1zt≤zαRVt + 1zt>zαBVt, (8)
Jt = 1zt>zα(RVt −BVt). (9)
where α is the upper 99.99%−quantile of N(0, 1).
3. Empirical methodology
In this section, we estimate the relationship between central bank inter-
vention and the different components of exchange rate volatility.
rt = 100× (pt − pt−1) (10)
rt = α0 + α1DIt + urt, (11)
In our model, central bank intervention on the exchange rate (It) is used as
an exogenous variable. We assume that daily exchange rate returns (rt) are
linearly dependent on the intervention series. Since our preliminary study
shows that the return process is more responsive to the occurrence of inter-
ventions relative to their exact value, we only include a dummy variable DIt
for intervention events on the right-hand-side of the return equation.
logCt = β0 + β1|It|+
6∑
j=1
βj+1 logCt−j + uct (12)
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Since the smooth (continuous) part of the exchange rate volatility path is
highly persistent, Eq. (12) is augmented with its lagged continuous compo-
nents in order to obtain robust parameter estimates9. This specification is
in the spirit of the Heterogeneous Autoregressive Realized Volatility model
of Anderson, Bollerslev and Diebold (2007).
J∗t = γ0 + γ1|It|+ uJ∗t, (13)
Jt = 0 J
∗
t ≤ 0,
Jt = J
∗
t J
∗
t > 0.
The derived data on jump volatility component (Jt) are censored at zero.
Hence we model it in the framework of a Tobit model to describe the re-
lationship between the true jump volatility process (J∗t ) and central bank
intervention1011.
3.1. Estimation strategy
Parameters in our model mentioned above are simultaneously estimated
using Hansen’s (1982) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
9The number of lags are determined based on the Q−test for residual autocorrelations.
Report of the Q−test statistics are available upon request.
10Analysis by Beine et al. (2007) strongly suggests that the causality between interven-
tions and jumps is unidirectional; intervention normally causes jumps rather than reacting
to it.
11We do not control for the effect of macroeconomic announcements on exchange rate
volatility. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, one cannot obtain the precise timing
of the interventions because such times are not recorded and published by the central
banks. While one could use auxiliary information from newswire reports as proposed by
Dominguez (2006), it is still unclear whether the timing of these reports is consistent and
thus potentially flawed to use such information. Secondly, analysis by Beine et al. (2007)
suggests that jumps are primarily the results of interventions and not macroeconomic
announcements. The existing literature trying to combine intervention data with newswire
reports suggest that the market is unaware of an intervention since these are carried out
in secrecy. This is the so-called “secrecy puzzle” in the literature. See Sarno and Taylor
(2001). Fatum (2009) reports that a firm report of intervention is typically on the newswire
the day after the intervention is carried out. Therefore, intervention can play no role in
the contemporaneous exchange rate responses.
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Denote the error terms as ut = [urt , uct , uJt ] and write the error term from
Eq. (10), Eq. (12), and Eq. (13) as:
urt = rt − α0 − α1DIt (14)
uct = logCt − β0 − β1|It| −
6∑
j=1
βj+1 logCt−j (15)
uJt = Jt − Φ(γ0 + γ1|It|)
[
γ0 + γ1|It|+ φ(γ0 + γ1|It|)
Φ(γ0 + γ1|It|)
]
(16)
where Φ(.) and φ(.) are denoted as the cumulative probability density func-
tion and probability density function of a standard normal, respectively.
Given a set of instrumental variables Zt which belongs to the information
set up to day t, we construct sample versions of the following restrictions to
estimate model parameters:
E[ut ⊗ Zt] = 0 (17)
Our natural selection of the set of instruments incude a constant term, central
bank interventions, and lagged continuous volatilities, i.e.
Zt = [1, It, logCt−1, logCt−2, logCt−3, logCt−4, logCt−5, logCt−6].
This provides us with nm = 24 orthogonal conditions for a total number of
k = 12 parameters in our model.
Let θ = [α0, α1, β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, γ0, γ1], and m(θ) contains nm
number of sample means of the restrictions in Eq.(17). The GMM estimator
of θ minimizes the criterion function:
GT = m(θ)
′Wm(θ), (18)
where W is a nm×nm optimal weighting matrix discussed in Hansen (1982).
The optimal weight is calculated as the inverted variance-covariance matrix
of sample moments (Sˆ):
Sˆ = Sˆ0 +
q∑
i=1
w(i)[Sˆi + Sˆ
′
i],
Sˆi =
1
T − k
T∑
t=i+1
mt(θˆ)mt−i(θˆ)′
9
where w(.) is the Newey and West (1987) kernel for the weight on each auto-
covariance of the sample moments m. According to Hansen (1982), when
the weighting matrix is optimal, Wˆ = Sˆ−1, one can compute the estimated
variances of the GMM estimates as:
Vˆ = [Mˆ ′Sˆ−1Mˆ ]−1/T, (19)
where Mˆ = ∂m(θˆ)
∂θ
. Moreover, the test statistic TGT is a measure for model
specification’s goodness of fit, where under the null,
TGT ∼ χ2nm−k. (20)
3.2. Data
We use five-minute high-frequency data on Japanese Yen to US Dollar
(USD/JPY) from April 1, 1991 to July 31, 2006 for computing daily realized
variances and the variance components (C and J). Also, we use five minute
intra-daily data from April 1, 1991 to March 31, 2004 for measuring daily
variations and their components of the returns on Japanese Yen to Deutsche
Mark (Euro) ((DEM/JPY)(EUR/JPY))12. Since the foreign exchange mar-
ket is on a 24-hour trading basis, we follow Andersen and Bollerslev (1998)
and set each trading day to start at 21:00 GMT on day t−1 to 21:00 GMT on
next day t. This setting ensures that the timing of foreign exchange returns
and intervention data are aligned more correctly. Figure 1 presents the trad-
ing hours for five major foreign exchange markets based on the GMT time.
Table 1 reports sample statistics of both returns and realized volatility com-
ponents of USD/JPY and DEM/JPY(EUR/JPY) series. It shows that CBI
operations seem to lower the averaged returns on USD/JPY. Furthermore,
by comparing the means of volatility components on regular days and on
the days with interventions, we find that intervention operations (unilateral
and coordinated) increase the averaged levels of persistent and jump volatil-
ities of both USD/JPY and DEM/JPY(EUR/JPY) series. The third and
fourth sample moments of both C and logC indicate that when the persis-
tent volatility component C is taken in logarithm, its empirical distribution
can be better approximated by a Gaussian distribution. Figure 2 represents
the averaged exchange rate movements of USD/JPY within a 24-hour trading
period in our sample.
12The source of both high-frequency and spot exchange rate data is Olsen and Asso-
ciates.
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Our intervention data for USD/JPY and DEM/JPY(EUR/JPY) exchange
rate series are downloaded from FRED at St. Louis Fed13. Due to the large
scale of Japanese interventions in Yen, the unit of measurement for each
Japanese intervention is one trillion yen. Among 4001 days between April
1, 1991 and July 31, 2006, the intervention data exhibits 333 days with
Japanese interventions on USD/JPY. Most of the intervention observations
are positive, i.e. buying US Dollar and selling Yen, except that at the begin-
ning of our sample period (from year 1991 to 1992), where we find 32 days
with negative interventions (buying Yen and selling US Dollar). Moreover,
during April 1, 1991 to December 31, 2003, we observe 22 days with coor-
dinated interventions from both Japan and US on USD/JPY market. This
includes 4 days with negative interventions (buying Yen/selling Dollar) and
18 days with positive interventions (buying Dollar/selling Yen). Figure 3
plots the time series of daily returns on USD/JPY, the sample path of the
continuous volatility and the jump volatility components. It also shows the
days with BOJ unilateral interventions, and days with coordinated BOJ-Fed
interventions.
For EUR/JPY, we only observe 19 days with unilateral Japanese inter-
ventions, all positive, i.e. buying Deutsche Mark (Euro)/selling Yen, out of
a total number of 3392 days in our sample period. Figure 4 shows the time
series of daily returns on DEM/JPY(EUR/JPY), the sample path of the
continuous volatility component and the sample path of the jump volatility
component. It also plots the days with unilateral BOJ interventions in the
DEM/JPY(EUR/JPY) market14.
4. Main findings
4.1. Results from the entire sample period: April 1, 1991 to July 31, 2006
Table 2 presents the results for the USD/JPY market for the entire sample
period. Columns (2)–(4) represent the coefficient estimates for the unilateral
interventions by BOJ. All coefficients are as expected. Most importantly,
the coefficient of CBI in the log continuous and jump equations, suggests
that unilateral intervention by BOJ tend to increase both the components of
13The data source is http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/32145.
14We did not have data on the coordinated yen-deutsche mark (euro) interventions.
Hence our analysis on coordinated interventions is only limited to the USD/JPY market.
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daily realized volatility. The effects of intervention are strong and statisti-
cally significant. These suggest that the efforts of BOJ in stabilizing either
the smooth persistent or jump components of realized volatility are coun-
terproductive. This finding suggests the ineffectiveness of BOJ interventions
in calming disorderly markets. Interventions by BOJ had increased market
volatility which not only caused short-lived jumps but were also persistent
over time. The coefficient estimates of the lagged log continuous volatil-
ity confirms the theory that the continuous component of the daily realized
volatility are highly persistent. However, the effect of intervention in the
mean equation is insignificant and ineffective. Table 2 shows that, on aver-
age, the sale of yen by the BOJ leads to an appreciation of the yen. This is
consistent with some of the previous literature that suggest that unilateral
interventions either have no causal effect or perverse effect on exchange rate
returns.
In Columns (5)–(7) on Table 2, we consider the case where coordinated
interventions were undertaken by both BOJ and the Fed. Some studies have
argued that concerted intervention efforts were more effective in influencing
the first and second order moments of exchange rate movements. See Catte
et al.(1994) and Nagayasu (2004) for greater details. Nagayasu (2004) finds
that coordinated interventions by BOJ and Fed were effective in influencing
the exchange rate returns, but interventions were always associated with an
increase in exchange rate volatility. The results from our analysis suggest that
coordinated intervention efforts had a positive impact on the exchange rates
returns, but these effects were statistically insignificant. The insignificant
results we find are different from the ones in Nagayasu (2004) since our sample
period is different from theirs. While Nagayasu’s sample period ends in
September 2001, our sample entends to July 2006. Most of the interventions
in the early part of the sample were ‘negative interventions’, i.e. purchase
of Japanese Yens and sale of US Dollars. Thus the interpretation of the
coefficients are different. We find positive significant effects of intervention
on exchange rate returns in the early part of the sample. Those are discussed
in our sub-sample analysis in the next sub-section.
Coordinated interventions by BOJ and the Fed had, however, failed to
stabilize the FX market volatility. These results are in line with the ones re-
ported by Nagayasu (2004). We find that coordinated intervention increased
both the continuous and the jump volatility components. Thus, neither uni-
lateral interventions nor concerted interventions were able to reduce short-
term transient or long-term persistent effects on daily realized volatility.
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Next, we check if the intervention efforts by BOJ were unique to the
USD/JPY market. Thus, we consider the effect of BOJ interventions for a
different currency pair. Table 3 reports the results of unilateral intervention
by BOJ in the DEM/JPY (EUR/JPY) market. During the sample period
April 1, 1991 to March 31, 2004, BOJ interventions were very infrequent
(for 19 days) in this market. The results indicate that interventions were
ineffective - it led to an increase in both the persistent and the jump volatil-
ity components. The effect on the exchange rate returns remain ineffective.
Thus, overall, unilateral interventions were neither able to stabilize the ex-
change rate volatility nor exchange rate returns. The model also shows that
the log continuous volatility is highly persistent15.
4.2. Results from sub-sample analysis
Some studies on the intervention on BOJ have found that FX interven-
tions are actually effective during large and infrequent interventions, while
they are ineffective during periods of small and frequent interventions16.
Some studies divide the entire period of intervention into two main sub-
periods: the pre-Sakakibara period and the post-Sakakibara period17 The
pre- and post- Sakakibara periods distinguish the small and frequent inter-
ventions from the large and infrequent ones. We consider this as the first
structural break. Few other studies like Ito and Melvin (1999) suggest an-
other break point in April, 1998.
Table 4 report the results for the unilateral BOJ interventions in the
USD/JPY market for the three sub-samples: (1) 1 April, 1991 to 1 June
1995, (2) 2 June, 1995 to 1 April, 1998, and (3) 2 April, 1998 to 31 July,
200618. Results in columns (2)–(4) report results for the first sub-sample.
We find that intervention increased the log continuous component of the
daily realized volatility. The coefficient of intervention on the jump com-
ponent is, however, positive but insignificant. This suggests that BOJ did
15Since the number of intervention days are quite few, the J-statistic of over-identifying
restrictions is high.
16See Fatum and Hutchison (2005), Hoshikawa (2008), and Hillebrand et al. (2009).
17Eisuke Sakakibara was the Director General of the International Finance Bureau and
was known as “Mr Yen” for his active foreign exchange policy.
18We also conduct a sub-sample analysis with the Asian Financial Crisis of 2007 as the
cut-off date. The qualitative results are similar. We do not report the results, but are
available from the authors upon request.
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not significantly influence the discontinuous jump volatility implying most
of intervention operations in this sub-sample period were not interpreted as
a ‘one-time’ event. Since interventions were small and frequent, markets ex-
pected this intervention to persist. This did not cause jumps in the volatility,
but increased the persistent continuous component of daily volatility. Our
method of decomposing and estimating the different components of daily
volatility is able to distinguish these two effects which none of the previous
studies had identified.
We also find that the coefficient of intervention in the return equation is
negative and significant. The interventions in the early part of the sub-sample
(till 1992) were negative (i.e. BOJ purchased Yens for Dollars) and the later
part of the sub-sample (1993 and 1994) had all positive interventions (i.e.
BOJ had sold Yens for Dollars). The results indicate that BOJ interventions
were effective in influencing the exchange rate returns. However, since we
had both positive and negative interventions in this sub-sample, the results
should be interpreted with caution and cannot be taken seriously.
Columns (5)–(7) in Table 4 presents results for the second sub-sample.
The results for the effect on volatility components are qualitatively simi-
lar; indicating that interventions did not have the desired effect for realized
volatility. It had increased the smooth continuous component, but the per-
sistent effect had diminished from the first sub-sample. This is consistent
with the fact that the pre- and post- Sakakibara period was characterized by
low and frequent versus high and infrequent interventions. As intervention
operations became infrequent, the expectations in the market diminished.
The impact on jumps was positive and insignificant, which is similar to the
first sub-sample.
The effect on FX returns was negative and significant. This implies that
BOJ interventions in the second segment was counterproductive. Purchase
of US dollars led to an appreciation of the Japanese Yen. As interventions
became infrequent, it had perverse effect on the exchange rate returns. This
result is consistent with the findings of the previous studies.
In Columns (8)–(10) of Table 4, the results of the last sub-sample are
provided. The coefficient of intervention in both the log continuous and the
jump equations are positive and significant. Therefore, BOJ interventions
became infrequent, it had more persistent effect on realized volatility. During
this period, interventions were also large. Thus the effect on jumps, the
short-lived transient volatility, was also high and significant. The effect on
the mean equation remained negative, but the results were insignificantly
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different from zero.
In summary, we find mixed evidence of the success of BOJ interventions
over time in the sub-sample analysis. We find some evidence that the low
and frequent intervention regimes was characterized by high and persistent
volatility with relatively little impact on jumps. As interventions became
smaller and more frequent, it increased jump component of realized volatility
as well. For exchange rate returns, our results indicate a mixed response over
the three sub-samples.
5. Conclusion
We analyze the effectiveness of interventions by Bank of Japan on the
USD/JPY and DEM/JPY(EUR/JPY) exchange rate series on influencing
the returns and exchange rate volatility. We use realized volatility to mea-
sure the uncertainty of exchange rate movements because it is a model-free
estimate and it provides an accurate proxy to the market volatility. We
decompose the realized volatility into a persistent continuous component
and a discontinuous jump component and model these interactions along
with returns using a simultaneous equation model. Using this framework,
we distinguish the effect of CBI on the different components of daily real-
ized volatility that most of the previous studies using GARCH-type models
have overlooked. One advantage of separating the smooth persistent volatil-
ity component and much less persistent jump process is that it can better
describe price (exchange rate) processes in-sample and also provides out-of-
sample forecast accuracy. We also address the issue of endogeneity by using
a simultaneous equation framework.
We find that intervention by Japanese monetary authority is ineffec-
tive in influencing the exchange rate returns or stabilizing either compo-
nents of daily realized volatility. Our results show that both the continuous
components and jumps in the realized volatility increased substantially by
the BOJ interventions. This result holds for both the USD/JPY and the
DEM/JPY(EUR/JPY) series. The result is also robust to unilateral inter-
ventions by BOJ and coordinated interventions by BOJ and Fed. We also
take into account the structural breaks in the USD/JPY series by differ-
entiating between frequent and low interventions with infrequent and high
interventions. We find that the effect on persistent component of the real-
ized volatility is positive and highly significant in all the three sub-samples.
However, the effect of BOJ interventions on the jump component is only sig-
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nificant in the last sub-sample when interventions were infrequent and high.
This is in contrast to some of the previous studies.
The effect on daily exchange rate returns are less clear. In particular,
when BOJ intervenes by selling or buying yen, there is insignificant impact
on the USD/JPY exchange rate returns. This result holds for the coordinated
intervention by BOJ and Fed in the USD/JPY market and unilateral inter-
vention by BOJ in the DEM/JPY(EUR/JPY) market. In the sub-sample
analysis, the result in only strongly negative for unilateral interventions by
BOJ in the USD/JPY market, i.e. selling of Yen by BOJ appreciates the
Yen. Overall, we do not find any evidence that interventions by BOJ are
successful in stabilizing the exchange rates or influencing the returns in the
proper direction. On the contrary, BOJ interventions are associated with
increasing both the persistent and the jump components of daily realized
volatility.
Our future work is to model the relation between the volatility and cen-
tral bank intervention using an extreme value theory, so that the estimation
results are not subject to any scaling constraints. Another direction of re-
search is to first uncover a few common factors that drive the joint dynamics
of level of the exchange rate, its volatility components and intervention in a
state–space factor model.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Derivatives of the Tobit Model
A Tobit model can be expressed as:
y∗t = x
′
tβ + t, t ∼ (0, σ2)
yt = 0 y
∗
t ≤ 0
yt = y
∗
t y
∗
t > 0
Since the observations on jumps in volatility are censored, the moment
conditions for the jump censored model (equation 13) is based on the error
term et:
et = yt − E(yt|xt) (21)
where19
E(yt|xt) = Φ
(
x′tβ
σ
)
(x′tβ + σλt) (22)
λt =
φ(xtβ/σ)
Φ(xtβ/σ)
(23)
Let
∂λt
∂β
=
−φ(xtβ/σ)(x′tβ/σ)(xt/σ)
Φ(x′tβ/σ)
− φ
2(x′tβ/σ)(xt/σ)
Φ2(x′tβ/σ)
(24)
Hence, the derivatives of et with respect to β are:
∂et
∂β
= −φ(x′tβ/σ)(x′tβ + σλt)xt/σ − Φ(x′tβ/σ)(xt + σ
∂λt
∂β
) (25)
19φ(x) and Φ(x) are the standard normal probability density function and cumulative
probability function, respectively.
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Figure 1: Opening hours of major foreign exchange markets
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Figure 2: Daily periodicity of USD/JPY
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0:00
1:00
2:00
3:00
4:00
5:00
6:00
7:00
8:00
9:00
10:00
11:00
12:00
13:00
14:00
15:00
16:00
17:00
18:00
19:00
20:00
21:00
22:00
23:00
 
22
F
ig
u
re
3:
T
im
e
se
ri
es
of
d
ai
ly
re
tu
rn
s,
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
a
n
d
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
s
o
n
U
S
D
/
J
P
Y
020
Co
nti
nu
ou
s v
ola
tilit
y c
om
po
ne
nt 
on
 US
D/J
PY
−
505
Re
tur
ns
 on
 US
D/J
PY
012
Ju
mp
 vo
lat
ility
 co
mp
on
en
t o
n U
SD
/JP
Y
01
Da
ys 
wit
h J
ap
an
 in
ter
ve
nti
on
s o
n U
SD
/JP
Y
 
 
4/1
99
1
2/1
99
3
1/1
99
5
12
/19
96
11
/19
98
10
/20
00
9/2
00
2
8/2
00
4
7/2
00
6
01
Da
ys 
wit
h U
S i
nte
rve
nti
on
s o
n U
SD
/JP
Y
JP
 (+)
JP
 (−)
JP
 (> 
1 tr
illio
n)
23
F
ig
u
re
4:
T
im
e
se
ri
es
of
d
ai
ly
re
tu
rn
s,
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
a
n
d
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
s
o
n
E
U
R
/
J
P
Y
−
505
Re
tur
ns
 on
 E
UR
/JP
Y
051015
Co
nti
nu
ou
s v
ola
tili
ty 
co
mp
on
en
t o
n E
UR
/JP
Y
02040
Ju
mp
 vo
lat
ilit
y c
om
po
ne
nt 
on
 E
UR
/JP
Y
4/1
99
1
3/1
99
3
2/1
99
5
1/1
99
7
12
/19
98
11
/20
00
10
/20
02
3/2
00
4
00.51
Da
ys
 w
ith
 B
oJ
 in
ter
ve
nti
on
s o
n E
UR
/JP
Y
24
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the returns and continuous and jump variance components
of USD/JPY and EUR/JPY
USD/JPY
Mean Std. Dev. Skew. Kurtosis Min Max
r -0.01 0.7 -0.48 8.33 -6.34 5.27
r on Intervention days -0.05 0.69 -0.48 8.33 -6.34 5.27
(Unilateral)
r on Intervention days -0.03 0.93 -0.48 3.06 -1.97 1.86
(Coordinated)
C 0.62 0.79 21.56 842.68 0.04 34.15
C on Intervention days 0.85 0.92 3.89 26.66 0.04 9.09
(Unilateral)
C on Intervention days 0.93 0.65 2.05 7.05 0.03 3.1
(Coordinated)
logC -0.74 0.65 0.59 4.39 -3.32 3.53
logC on intervention days -0.53 0.85 0.05 3.12 -3.19 2.21
(Unilateral)
logC on Intervention days -0.25 0.57 0.67 3.06 -1.07 1.13
(Coordinated)
J 0.01 0.07 14.26 271.2 0 1.74
J on Intervention days 0.03 0.15 8.26 81.73 0 1.74
(Unilateral)
J on Intervention days 0.04 0.14 3.84 16.64 0 0.64
(Coordinated)
EUR/JPY
r 0.00 0.42 0.79 35.67 -3.97 4.58
r on Intervention days 0.00 0.09 -0.36 35.67 -3.97 4.58
C 0.77 0.83 5.77 59.74 0.00 14.07
C on Intervention days 1.21 1.44 2.42 8.6 0.25 6.17
logC -0.56 0.74 0.06 5.40 -6.37 2.64
logC on Intervention days -0.23 0.85 0.83 2.84 -1.38 1.82
J 0.05 0.6 33.89 1378.9 0 26.88
J on Intervention days 0.24 0.88 3.83 16.08 0 3.81
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Table 2: Estimation of model (11) through (13) in the USD/JPY market for sample April
1, 1991 to July 31, 2006: GMM estimates of 3 equations (12 parameters). 9 instrumental
variables and the Newey-West Spectral density with 15 lags have been used. The GMM χ2
(Hansen’s J − statistic) for the validity of overidentifying restrictions is 10.129 (p− value
= 0.605) for the unilateral intervention model and 8.743 (p − value = 0.725) for the
coordinated intervention model.
Unilateral Intervention Model Coordinated Intervention Model
Model r logC J r logC J
α0 -0.003 -0.008
(0.013) (0.018)
α1 -0.035 0.3
(0.076) (1.929)
β0 -0.115 -0.212
(0.015) (0.066)
β1 0.664 11.036
(0.301) (6.699)
β2 0.415 0.379
(0.021) (0.065)
β3 0.138 0.085
(0.018) (0.044)
β4 0.076 0.054
(0.017) (0.042)
β5 0.081 0.097
(0.017) (0.033)
β6 0.136 0.174
(0.019) (0.04)
β7 0.017 0.022
(0.017) (0.037)
γ0 -2.152 -2.443
(0.053) (0.283)
γ1 1.625 3.114
(0.433) (0.826)
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Table 3: Estimation of model (11) through (13) in the DEM/JPY(EUR/JPY) market for
sample April 1, 1991 to March 31, 2004: GMM estimates of 3 equations (12 parameters). 9
instrumental variables and the Newey-West Spectral density with 10 lags have been used.
The GMM χ2 (Hansen’s J − statistic) for the validity of overidentifying restrictions is
26.684 (p-value = 0.0086).
Model r logC J
α0 -0.161
(0.267)
α1 -1.336
(2.321)
β0 -0.057
(0.012)
β1 1.637
(0.644)
β2 0.374
(0.023)
β3 0.161
(0.0163)
β4 0.09
(0.015)
β5 0.093
(0.015)
β6 0.104
(0.036)
β7 0.077
(0.022)
γ0 -1.484
(0.086)
γ1 5.257
(4.27)
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Table 4: Estimation of model (11) through (13) in the USD/JPY market for sub-samples:
(1) April 1, 1991 to June 1, 1995 (2) June 2, 1995 - April 1, 1998, and (3) April 2, 1998
- July 31, 2006: GMM estimates of 3 equations (12 parameters). 9 instrumental variables
and the Newey-West Spectral density with 10 lags have been used. The GMM χ2 (Hansen’s
J − statistic) for the validity of overidentifying restrictions is 28.76 (p − value = 0.004)
for sample 1, 23.437 (p− value = 0.024) for sample 2 and 15.529 (p− value = 0.214) for
sample 3.
Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2 Sub-sample 3
Model r logC J r logC J r logC J
α0 -0.026 0.035 0.002
(0.02) (0.023) (0.016)
α1 -0.165 -0.62 -0.069
(0.069) (0.31) (0.071)
β0 -0.179 -0.101 -0.141
(0.017) (0.02) (0.022)
β1 5.431 0.899 0.568
(0.973) (0.323) (0.082)
β2 0.407 0.418 0.395
(0.024) (0.042) (0.027)
β3 0.113 0.118 0.14
(0.03) (0.033) (0.023)
β4 0.093 0.085 0.077
(0.028) (0.025) (0.021)
β5 0.066 0.02 0.087
(0.03) (0.029) (0.021)
β6 0.142 0.108 0.132
(0.025) (0.053) (0.022)
β7 -0.006 0.041 0.03
(0.031) (0.032) (0.021)
γ0 -6.971 -5.193 -2.05
(575.14) (8839.94) (0.056)
γ1 0.972 0.895 0.889
(390.68) (1219.55) (0.198)
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